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Abstract 
Presuppositions convey information that comprehenders assume to be true, even when it is 
tangential to the communicator’s main message. For example, a class of verbs called ‘factives’ 
(e.g. realize, know) trigger the presupposition that the events or states conveyed by their 
sentential complements are true. In contrast, non-factive verbs (e.g. think, believe) do not trigger 
this presupposition. We asked whether, during language comprehension, presuppositions 
triggered by factive verbs are encoded within the comprehender’s discourse model, with neural 
consequences if violated by later bottom-up inputs. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we 
examined neural activity to words that were either consistent or inconsistent with events/states 
conveyed by the complements of factive versus non-factive verbs while comprehenders read and 
actively monitored the coherence of short discourse scenarios. We focused on the modulation of 
a posteriorly-distributed late positivity or P600. This ERP component is produced when 
comprehenders constrain their discourse model such that it restricts predictions only to event 
structures that are compatible with this model, and new input violates these event structure 
predictions. Between 500-700ms, we observed a larger amplitude late posterior positivity/P600 
on words that were inconsistent (versus consistent) with the events/states conveyed by the 
complements of factive verbs. No such effect was observed following non-factive verbs. These 
findings suggest that, during active discourse comprehension, the presuppositions triggered by 
factive verbs are encoded and maintained within the comprehender’s discourse model. 
Downstream input that is inconsistent with these presuppositions violates event structure 
predictions and conflicts with this prior model, producing the late posterior positivity/P600.  
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1 Introduction 
During discourse comprehension, we are able to use certain linguistic cues to infer that 
certain events and states are true, regardless of whether their truth is central to the main message 
being conveyed. In theoretical semantics, such inferences are known as presuppositions, and 
they are triggered by particular words or phrases known as presupposition triggers (e.g., 
Karttunen 1973; Stalnaker 1974; Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Heim, 1982; for a detailed 
introduction of presupposition, see Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 2000; Beaver & Geurts, 2012; 
and Romoli & Sauerland, 2017). In the present study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs), a 
direct time-locked measure of brain activity, to study the effects of presuppositions that are 
triggered by a class of verbs — factive verbs — on downstream neural activity as comprehenders 
actively read and monitored the coherence of short discourse scenarios.  
Factive verbs, such as “realize” and “know”, trigger the presupposition that the particular 
events or states conveyed by their sentential complements are true (Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1971). 
For example, in the sentence, “John realized that the keys were on the shelf”, the factive verb, 
“realize” triggers the presupposition that the keys are, in fact, on the shelf. This presupposition 
holds even if this sentence is negated, e.g. “John did not realize that the keys were on the shelf”. 
This illustrates two important characteristics of presuppositions. First, they are inherited by more 
complex sentences — a behavior known as “presupposition projection” (e.g. Karttunen, 1973; 
Heim, 1983). Second, they are inferred even when they are not part of the communicator’s main 
point (not “at issue”, e.g., Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver & Roberts, 2011; Tonhauser, 2012): in the 
sentence examples above, the main point of the message is to convey John’s state of mind rather 
than the fact that the keys are actually on the shelf. Factive verbs can be contrasted with non-
factive verbs such as “believe” and “assume”, which do not lead us to infer the truth of 
information conveyed by their complements. For example, the sentence “John assumed that the 
keys are on the shelf” does not presuppose whether or not the keys are on the shelf.  
 Sentences that violate presuppositions are usually judged to be unacceptable (e.g. Amaral 
& Cummins, 2015; Cummins, Amaral, & Katsos 2013; Tiemann et al., 2011; Singh, Fedorenko, 
& Gibson, 2015; but see Bill, Romoli, Schwarz, & Crain, 2016). This is also true of sentences 
that violate the presuppositions induced by factive verbs (although most of these studies tested 
just one or two factive verbs — usually “regret”, “know” or “realize”, e.g., Chemla and Bott, 
2013; Schulz, 2003; Tiemann et al., 2011). Such offline acceptability judgments, however, tell us 
little about the use of presuppositions during online comprehension. 
   Most psycholinguistic studies examining the use of presuppositions during online 
comprehension have used a violation paradigm to ask how quickly presuppositions are 
generated. In these studies, processing was measured at the presupposition trigger itself, and the 
preceding context was manipulated such that it was either consistent or inconsistent with the 
resulting presupposition. For example, Tiemann et al. (2015) measured reading times on the 
presupposition trigger, “again”, following  contexts that either conveyed that a particular event 
had occurred  (context consistent) or not (context inconsistent), e.g., “Last week, Linda bought 
Judith a pink lamp … Two days ago, {(a) Judith / (b) Linda} received a pink lamp again…”). 
Self-paced reading and eye tracking studies show evidence of a relative slow-down on (or 
straight after) the region containing an inconsistent (versus an consistent) presupposition trigger 
(Clifton, 2013; Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Tiemann, 2017; Tiemann et al., 2015). In addition, 
work using the visual world paradigm suggests that comprehenders are able to detect a mismatch 
between prior contextual information and a presupposition trigger as early as 200ms following 
the trigger’s onset (Chambers & San Juan, 2008; Romoli, Khan, Snedeker, & Sudo, 2015; 
Schwarz, 2015). Finally, a recent ERP study reported a larger positive-going waveform from 
350-450ms following the presupposition trigger, “again”, when it was inconsistent versus 
consistent with information conveyed by the context (Jouravlev et al., 2016). This earlier 
positivity effect was followed by a later positivity effect between 450-750ms (see Discussion).1  
  Taken together, these findings suggest that the brain can generate presuppositions very 
quickly as language unfolds in real time. However, they do not tell us about whether these 
presuppositions are encoded and maintained within the comprehender’s discourse model, and 
whether they are used to constrain expectations of subsequent information during 
comprehension. One way of addressing this question is to use factive verbs. Because such verbs 
precede their complements, it is possible to examine processing of downstream input that is 
either consistent or inconsistent with the presuppositions that they trigger. As we discuss next, 
there is some preliminary evidence that inputs violating these presuppositions are associated with 
costs in processing. 
 In an early eye-tracking study, Inhoff (1985) reported longer gaze durations, but no 
effects on first fixations, on complements communicating false common-knowledge facts 
following factive versus non-factive verbs (e.g., “He knew/said that two and two equaled three”). 
This was taken as evidence that factivity modulates the integration of incoming words into the 
discourse model (indexed by gaze duration), but that it has no effect on the initial lexical 
retrieval of these words (indexed by first fixations). However, given the well-established finding 
that it takes longer to process words in sentences that are incongruous (versus congruous) with 
                                                 
1 Other studies have examined ERPs associated with the so-called uniqueness presupposition, triggered by definite 
noun-phrases (e.g., Heim, 1982). Rather than examine the consequences of violating this presupposition, these 
studies focused on the neurocognitive mechanisms engaged in its accommodation. We provide a brief overview of 
this group of studies in the Supplementary Material. 
real-world knowledge (e.g. Marslen-Wilson, Brown, & Tyler, 1988), these findings are difficult 
to interpret. 
In other work using ERPs, Ferretti and colleagues (Ferretti, Singer, & Patterson, 2008; 
Ferretti, Singer & Harwood, 2013) explored the effects of factivity as participants read short 
stories. These stories introduced a context that communicated a particular event, e.g. “…Ken and 
his brother ate some oranges/apples…” (sentence 2 in a story), which was later followed by 
either a factive or a non-factive verb and a complement that described an event that was either 
consistent or inconsistent with the initial event, e.g. “… the coach determined/figured that it was 
oranges that Ken ate…” (sentence 5). Critical nouns (e.g. “oranges”) that followed both factive 
and non-factive verbs elicited a larger negativity between 300-500ms (N400) when they were 
inconsistent versus consistent with the event described in the preceding context. However, this 
negativity effect continued into a later 600-1000ms window only when critical nouns followed 
factive verbs. Aspects of the design of this study, however, limit interpretation. Specifically, 
critical words that were consistent with the event described in the context were always repeated 
(e.g. “oranges” following “oranges”), whereas those that were inconsistent with the event 
described were not (e.g. “oranges” following “apples”). Since the amplitude of the N400 is 
attenuated by word repetition (e.g., Karayanidis, Andrews, Ward, & McConaghy, 1991; Rugg, 
1985), even at long lags (e.g., Bentin & Peled, 1990; Van Petten, Kutas, Kluender, Mitchiner, & 
McIsaac, 1991), this introduced a confound between the consistent and inconsistent conditions. 
In addition, the authors do not report the process by which they selected the factive and non-
factive verbs, or how many time any specific verb was repeated. Notably, some examples given 
in their papers (e.g. “determine” in Ferretti et al., 2008, and “was certain” in Ferretti et al., 2013) 
suggest that some verbs may have been incorrectly assigned to the factive class (e.g. the 
compound “is certain” is usually classified as non-factive based on linguistic diagnostics of 
presupposition).  
 Building on this previous work, the current study used ERPs to determine whether 
presuppositions triggered by factive verbs (i.e., that their complements are true) are encoded 
within the comprehender’s discourse model such that it restricts expectations of upcoming 
events/states only to those that are compatible with the presupposition. For example, consider the 
discourse context, “Calvin needed to meet with his team members in the conference room. He 
was aware that it was busy.”.  Here, the factive verb, “aware”, triggers the presupposition that the 
conference room was actually busy. The question we asked is whether this presupposition is 
incorporated and maintained within the comprehender’s discourse model such it restricts 
predictions of upcoming events and states only to those that are compatible with a busy 
conference room, excluding the possibility of later encountering incompatible events/states (e.g. 
a vacant conference room). 
 To address this question, we measured ERPs on words that were either consistent or 
inconsistent with a prior event/state that was conveyed by the complement of either a factive or a 
non-factive verb (e.g. “Calvin needed to meet with his team members in the conference room. He 
was aware that/presumed that it was unused/busy. He checked and it was vacant…”). Thus, our 
study crossed Verb factivity (factive versus non-factive verbs) and Event consistency (an event 
or state that was consistent versus inconsistent with the information conveyed by the verb’s 
complement).   
 Our main focus was on the modulation of a late positive-going ERP component with a 
posterior scalp distribution, otherwise known as the P600.2 The precise neurocognitive 
mechanisms that are indexed by the late posterior positivity/P600 are debated, and we consider 
this further in the Discussion section (4.1). At this stage, we note that this ERP component is 
produced when comprehenders constrain their discourse model such that it restricts predictions 
only to sets of events and states (referred to as ‘event structures’) that are compatible with this 
model, and new input violates these event structure predictions (Kuperberg, 2013 and Xiang & 
Kuperberg, 2015). At the very least, the late posterior positivity/P600 reflects the detection of a 
conflict between the new input and the prior mental model (see Kuperberg & Wlotko, 2018 for 
recent discussion; see also Kuperberg, 2007; Paczynski & Kuperberg, 2012; Kim & Osterhout, 
2005; van de Meerendonk, et al., 2009). 
 It therefore follows that if the presuppositions triggered by factive verbs are incorporated 
into the discourse model, thereby restricting predictions only to upcoming events/states that are 
compatible with the presupposition, then event inconsistent incoming words should evoke a 
larger late posterior positivity/P600 than event consistent incoming words (e.g. in the example 
above, a larger late posterior positivity/P600 should be evoked by “vacant” following “…busy” 
than following “…unused”). No such modulation should be seen in non-factive scenarios 
because these do not trigger presuppositions. If, however, the presuppositions triggered by 
factive verbs are not encoded or maintained within the comprehender’s discourse model, then 
there should be no differences between the factive and non-factive scenarios in the effect of 
event consistency on the late posterior positivity/P600. 
                                                 
2 Here we refer primarily to the late posterior positivity/P600 that is evoked by semantic violations (see Kuperberg, 
2007 for a review). Some of the ideas discussed in this paper are also relevant to understanding the late posterior 
positivity/P600 evoked by words that are syntactically anomalous or dispreferred (Hagoort, Brown, & Groothusen, 
1993; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992; 1993). 
 In addition to asking whether factive verbs lead comprehenders to restrict their 
predictions to particular event structures, we were also interested in whether they lead 
comprehenders to generate stronger predictions about specific individual events and their 
associated semantic features/properties. For example, does the presupposition that a conference 
room is busy, and the prediction of an event structure that excludes incompatible events/states 
(e.g. a vacant conference room) lead comprehenders to generate predictions about possible 
individual events/states that are compatible with busy conference rooms, along with their 
associated semantic properties and features (e.g. <noisy>, <lights on>, <full of people>)? 
 To address this question, we examined the N400 ERP component (Kutas and Hillyard 
1984; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999; Kuperberg, 2016). Modulation on the N400 was first reported 
in response to words that were inconsistent versus consistent with their preceding sentential 
(Kutas & Hillyard, 1980) or discourse (van Berkum, Hagoort & Brown, 1999) context. However, 
the N400 is not always or necessarily modulated by contextual consistency, particularly if 
schema-based relationships between content words are matched across conditions (see 
Kuperberg, 2016 and references therein). This is because the N400 does not directly reflect the 
difficulty of computing a coherent higher-order representation of meaning. Rather, it is thought 
to reflect the degree to which the semantic features of an incoming word match those that were 
pre-activated by the preceding context (see Supplementary Materials and Kuperberg, 2016, for 
further discussion). Most relevant to the present study, contextual cues that lead comprehenders 
to restrict their expectations to a particular event structure do not always or necessarily enhance 
the pre-activation of semantic features associated with specific events. When they do, both an 
N400 and a late posterior positivity/P600 effect are observed on contextually inconsistent (versus 
consistent) critical words (e.g. Experiment 1: Xiang & Kuperberg, 2015). When they do not, 
only a late posterior positivity/P600 effect, but no N400 effect, is observed on contextually 
inconsistent (versus consistent) critical words (see Kuperberg, 2007 for a review). Thus, in the 
present study, if factive verbs lead comprehenders not only to constrain their predictions to an 
upcoming event structure, but also to enhance their predictions of upcoming specific events and 
their associated semantic features, then event inconsistent (versus event consistent) words in the 
factive scenarios should produce not only a larger late posterior positivity/P600 but also a larger 
N400 effect than in the non-factive scenarios. If, however, factive verbs do not lead 
comprehenders to enhance their predictions of specific upcoming events/semantic features, then 
the effect of event consistency should not differ between the factive and the non-factive 
scenarios. 
 
2 Methods 
2.1 Development of stimuli  
In order to develop and characterize the stimuli, we carried out a series of norming 
studies and used data collected from various linguistic databases, as described below. For the 
norming studies, participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). 
Informed consent was obtained in all participants, and they were compensated for their time. 
Participants who had early exposure to a language other than English, and who had psychiatric or 
neurological illness, past neurological damage including stroke and concussion, or current 
treatment with psychoactive medication, were excluded. Prior to carrying out the norming tasks, 
participants completed a guided practice. In addition, “catch” questions were used to identify and 
exclude bots or inattentive participants.  
 
2.1.1 Selection and classification of verbs: We began with an initial list of attitude verbs (e.g. 
“realized”) or verb compounds (e.g., “found out”). We then narrowed the list down to 91 verbs 
that we classified as either factive or non-factive, based on linguistic diagnostics of 
presupposition heritability (e.g., that the presupposition is maintained under negation). Then, to 
further assess the factivity of these verbs, we carried out a rating study. We embedded each verb 
into 16 different sentences that comprised a subject, the verb (with or without negation, in the 
past or present tense), a complementizer (“that”), and an ending that described an event or a 
state, e.g. “John realized that his wife was waiting in the car”. The same event/state was paired 
with four different verbs, with the exception of three events that were paired with three different 
verbs. The sentences were then counterbalanced across eight different lists so that different 
endings never appeared in the same list.  
Seventy-two participants (nine per list) were instructed to rate how certain they were that 
the event being described in the sentence actually happened (or was actually happening) on a 
scale of 1 to 5. Based on these certainty judgments, we selected 27 verbs from sentences that 
were given ratings of above 3.4 and classified these as factive verbs (mean rating: 3.8; SD: 0.23), 
and 27 verbs from sentences that were given ratings of below 2.9 and classified these as non-
factive verbs (mean rating: 2.8; SD: 0.17). There was no significant difference in the frequency 
of the factive and non-factive verbs (t(44) = 0.61; p =.54).3 
 
2.1.2 Construction of experimental scenarios: Using the selected factive verbs and non-factive 
verbs, we constructed 152 quadruplets of three-sentence scenarios — four different versions of 
each scenario that corresponded to each of the experimental conditions. In all scenarios, the first 
                                                 
3 Only verbs, and not compounds (e.g., “is amazed”), were included in this analysis. 
sentence introduced the characters and the general situation; the second sentence included a 
human subject followed by either a factive or a non-factive verb, the complementizer “that”, and 
an ending that described an event or a state (similar to those used in the sentence judgment task 
used to select the verbs, described above). Finally, a critical word in the third sentence was either 
consistent or inconsistent with the event or state that was described by the complement of the 
verb in the second sentence.  
 This resulted in a 2x2 design with Verb factivity (factive, non-factive) and Event 
consistency (event consistent, event inconsistent) as factors, creating four experimental 
conditions: (1) a factive verb in the second sentence with a critical word in the third sentence that 
was consistent with the event/state described (factive consistent); (2) a factive verb in the second 
sentence with a critical word in the third sentence that was inconsistent with the event/state 
described (factive inconsistent); (3) a non-factive verb in the second sentence with a critical word 
in the third sentence that was consistent with the event/state described (non-factive consistent), 
and (4) a non-factive verb in the second sentence with a critical word in the third sentence that 
was inconsistent with the event/state described (non-factive inconsistent). Because the third 
sentences, including the critical words, were identical in all versions of same scenario, the 
events/states described in the second sentence differed between the Event consistent and 
inconsistent conditions. Examples of scenarios, along with the full list of verbs, are given in 
Table 1. 
 
2.1.3 Plausibility ratings: We gathered plausibility ratings for the initial set of experimental 
scenarios from 36 participants (9 per list), using AMT. The three-sentence scenarios were 
presented up until and including the critical word, with an ellipsis to indicate that the scenario 
could continue after this word. They were counterbalanced across four balanced and randomized 
lists. Participants were told that they were seeing ‘beginnings of scenarios’ and were asked to 
rate how much the scenarios made sense to them on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 for scenarios that did not 
make sense at all and 5 for scenarios that made complete sense).  Due to technical problems, we 
collected ratings for 144 (out of 152) scenarios. 
 
Table 1. Example stimuli and full list of factive and non-factive verbs used in the study. 
In the example stimuli, factive and non-factive verbs are marked in bold; the word within the context that determines 
whether the subsequent critical word will be consistent or inconsistent with the previous context is marked in italics, 
and the critical word itself (to which ERPs were time-locked) is underlined.  
 
Factive Non-factive  
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent 
Bruce taught a class on 
quantum physics. He saw 
that his students had 
mastered the material. 
Almost all of them scored 
perfectly on every test. 
Bruce taught a class on 
quantum physics. He saw 
that his students were 
confused by the material.  
Almost all of them scored 
perfectly on every test. 
Bruce taught a class on 
quantum physics. He was 
sure that his students had 
mastered the material.  
Almost all of them scored 
perfectly on every test. 
Bruce taught a class on 
quantum physics. He was 
sure that his students were 
confused by the material.  
Almost all of them scored 
perfectly on every test. 
Calvin needed to meet 
with his team members in 
the conference room. He 
was aware that it was 
unused. He checked and it 
was vacant and dark. 
Calvin needed to meet 
with his team members in 
the conference room. He 
was aware that it was 
busy. He checked and it 
was vacant and dark. 
Calvin needed to meet 
with his team members in 
the conference room. He 
presumed that it was 
unused. He checked and it 
was vacant and dark. 
Calvin needed to meet 
with his team members in 
the conference room. He 
presumed that it was 
busy. He checked and it 
was vacant and dark. 
Melanie and Billy were 
taking a walk together. 
She resented that he 
walked too quickly. She 
was always behind by 
several steps. 
Melanie and Billy were 
taking a walk together. 
She resented that he 
walked too slowly. She 
was always behind by 
several steps. 
Melanie and Billy were 
taking a walk together. 
She suggested that he 
walked too quickly. She 
was always behind by 
several steps. 
Melanie and Billy were 
taking a walk together. 
She suggested that he 
walked too slowly. She 
was always behind by 
several steps. 
Lila is very open with her 
emotions.  Her boyfriend 
grasped that she was 
upset.  She was crying all 
day long. 
Lila is very open with her 
emotions.  Her boyfriend 
grasped that she was 
happy.  She was crying all 
day long. 
Lila is very open with her 
emotions.  Her boyfriend 
assumed that she was 
upset.  She was crying all 
day long. 
Lila is very open with her 
emotions.  Her boyfriend 
assumed that she was 
happy.  She was crying all 
day long. 
Factive verbs Non-factive verbs 
accept, acknowledge, care, discover, figure out, find out, 
forget, grasp, is amazed, is aware, is bothered, is 
informed, is shocked, is surprised, know, mind, notice, 
realize, recognize, regret, remember, resent, reveal, see, 
spot, take into account, take into consideration. 
allege, assume, believe, claim, decide, estimate, expect, 
feel, figure, guess, hope, hypothesize, imagine, infer, is 
sure, postulate, predict, presume, reckon, sense, 
speculate, suggest, suppose, suspect, theorize, think, 
trust 
  
Table 2: Stimulus characteristics. 
Scenario Type 
Plausibility 
ratings# 
Cloze* Constraint** LSA^ 
Factive 
consistent 
4.38 
[0.32] 
22%  
[28%] 
45%  
[22%] 
0.062 [0.089] 
Factive 
inconsistent 
1.64 
[0.43] 
7%  
[16%] 
35%  
[18%] 
0.061 [0.089] 
Non-factive 
consistent 
4.32 
[0.37] 
26%  
[29%] 
46%  
[22%] 
0.059 [0.087] 
Non-factive 
inconsistent 
1.75 
[0.49] 
9%  
[20%] 
37%  
[21%] 
0.058 [0.088] 
Means are shown with standard deviations in square parentheses.  
#Plausibility ratings on a 5-point Likert scale up until and including the critical word.  
*Cloze probability of the critical words was calculated as the proportions of participants in the norming study who 
responded with this word.  
**Constraint of the critical words was calculated as the proportion of most common completion out of the total 
number of responses for each stem, regardless of whether or not it matched the critical word.  
^LSA: Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Landauer et al., 1998). Semantic Similarity Values 
(SSVs) between the critical words and their preceding contexts are given.   
 
 The ratings are shown in Table 2. A 2 (Verb factivity) x 2 (Event consistency) ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Event consistency (F(1,143) = 4068.5, p < .0001), 
confirming that, at the point of the critical word, participants did indeed rate the event 
inconsistent scenarios as more implausible than the event consistent scenarios. There was no 
main effect of Verb factivity (F(1,154) = 0.76, p = .39). As expected, there was a significant 
interaction between Verb factivity and Event consistency (F(1,143) = 7.15, p = .008), due to 
lower plausibility ratings in the inconsistent factive scenarios than in the inconsistent non-factive 
scenarios (t(143) = 2.68, p = .008). This finding reflects the assumption that factive verbs, unlike 
non-factive verbs, create an expectation of truth via their presupposition, and so inconsistent 
factive scenarios received lower plausibility ratings than inconsistent non-factive scenarios. 
 
2.1.4 Cloze norming of experimental scenarios: We aimed to match the cloze probability of 
critical words between the event consistent factive and non-factive scenarios, and between the 
event inconsistent factive and non-factive scenarios. To do this, we collected cloze probabilities 
for the initial set of experimental scenarios from 40 participants (10 per list) using AMT. For 
each scenario, the critical word and all other words until the end of the third sentence were 
replaced with an ellipsis (e.g., “The court held a trial yesterday. At the end, the defendant 
realized that he won. The jury decided to…”). These scenario stems were then counterbalanced 
across four balanced and randomized lists. Participants were asked to read each scenario stem 
and then, in a free-response box, to type a single word that most likely followed the context. The 
cloze probabilities of the critical words in the four conditions were calculated as the proportions 
of participants who responded with that word. Then, in order to match cloze probabilities of 
critical words in the factive and non-factive scenarios within each level of Event consistency, we 
changed selected critical words and re-clozed the corresponding scenarios (40 participants) in 
order to come up with our final stimulus set. 
Cloze values of the final stimulus set are shown in Table 2. A 2 (Verb factivity) x 2 (Event 
consistency) ANOVA revealed, as expected, a significant difference in the cloze probability of 
critical words in the consistent and inconsistent scenarios (a significant main effect of Event 
consistency, F(1,151) = 83.14, p < .001).4 There was also a marginal effect of Verb factivity 
(F(1,151) = 3.46, p = .065) due to very slightly lower cloze values of critical words in the factive 
than the non-factive scenarios. Importantly, there was no interaction between Verb factivity and 
Event consistency (F(1,151) = 0.72, p > .39).  
                                                 
4 A few of the event inconsistent items had greater-than-zero cloze probabilities because of constraining local 
(rather than global) contexts. We reanalyzed the ERP dataset after excluding these items (that is, including only 
zero-cloze event inconsistent items). The pattern of results was the same. 
We also calculated the lexical constraint of each scenario stem: the proportion of most 
common completion out of the total number of responses for each stem, regardless of whether or 
not it matched the critical word, see Table 2. The average constraint of the contexts across all 
conditions was 0.4. Scenario stems in which the critical word was consistent were more lexically 
constraining than those in which the critical words were inconsistent (effect of Event consistency 
(F(1,151) = 29.26, p < .001)). There was no main effect of Verb factivity (F(1,151) = 1.1, p < 
.29) and no interaction between these two factors (F(1, 151) = 0.11, p > .74).  
 
2.1.5 Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA): While our main focus was on the late posterior 
positivity/P600 component, we were also interested in whether the contexts in the different 
conditions would lead to differential prediction of specific events, thereby modulating the N400 
on critical words. It was therefore important to rule out the possibility that the conditions differed 
in the degree to which they pre-activated more general schemas (see Myers & O’Brien, 1998; 
Gerrig & McKoon, 1998; see also Duffy, Henderson & Morris, 1989; Foss & Ross, 1983; 
Carroll & Slowiaczek, 1986; Morris & Folk, 1998), which can also modulate the N400 without 
necessarily entailing differential pre-activation of specific events (see Paczynski & Kuperberg, 
2012, Kuperberg, Paczynski & Ditman, 2011, and Kuperberg, 2016 for recent discussion). We 
therefore used LSA, which can capture knowledge about multiple different semantic 
relationships between words and concepts, including schema-based relationships, to extract 
Semantic Similarity Values (SSVs) between the critical words and their preceding contexts in all 
four conditions (obtained from CU Boulder at lsa.colorado.edu: Landauer & Dumais, 1997; 
Landauer et al., 1998). We found no differences in SSVs across conditions (see Table 2), as 
reflected by a 2 (Event confirmation) x 2 (Verb factivity) ANOVA, which revealed no main 
effects or interactions (all Fs < 2.16, ps > .14).5 
 
2.1.6 Setup of lists for the ERP experiment: The final set of experimental scenarios was divided 
into four lists, which were randomized and counterbalanced using a Latin Square design such 
that each participant would see only one version of each scenario. We added 70 coherent filler 
scenarios to each list in order to introduce some variation in the stimuli and to increase the rate of 
‘acceptable’ judgments for the task used in the ERP experiment (as described below). Like the 
experimental scenarios, all fillers included three sentences and told a short story. However, 
unlike the experimental scenarios, the events/states introduced in the third sentences of the filler 
scenarios were new, continuing the scenarios (e.g., “Wesley spent the day painting his kitchen. 
His wife confirmed that the room looked much better. She wanted him to paint the bathroom as 
well.”). None of the experimental verbs were included in the filler scenarios in any position. 
Thus, each of the four lists comprised 152 experimental scenarios (with 38 scenarios per 
condition) and 70 filler scenarios. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four lists 
(six participants per list). 
 
                                                 
5 Because of the way the stimuli were constructed, each pair of conditions differed by only a single word within the 
context (aside from the factive/non-factive verb itself). Thus, an alternative possibility was that, during 
comprehension, the lexical representation of this single word would linger in its relatively raw form, leading 
differential lexico-semantic ‘priming’ of the critical word across conditions (e.g. Forster, 1981; Norris, 1986; see 
also Fodor, 1983). For example, “unused” (in the event consistent scenarios) might be more likely than “busy” (in 
the event inconsistent scenarios) to prime the critical word, “vacant”. However, behavioral (Foss & Ross, 1983; 
Morris, 1994, Experiment 2; Traxler & Foss, 2000) and ERP (Camblin, Gordon, & Swaab, 2007; Coulson, 
Federmeier, Van Petten, & Kutas, 2005; Van Petten, 1993) studies suggest that this type of single word lexical 
priming plays a minimal role in sentence and discourse comprehension. 
2.2 ERP Experiment 
2.2.1 Participants: We report data from 24 individuals. Twenty-six individuals from the greater 
Boston area initially participated, but the datasets of two of the original participants were 
subsequently excluded due to excessive artifacts, leaving 24 datasets in the final analyses (10 
females; mean age: 21.8 years; range: 18-35 years). All participants were right-handed (as 
assessed by the Edinburgh handedness inventory; Oldfield, 1971), native English speakers 
(having learned no other language before the age of 5), with no history of psychiatric or 
neurological disorders. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history 
of head trauma. They provided informed consent in accordance with the Institutional Review 
Board of Tufts University and were compensated for their time. 
 
2.2.2 Experimental procedures: Participants sat in a quiet, dimly lit room facing a computer 
monitor. Stimuli were presented in white font centered on a black background. Each trial started 
with the word “READY” and participants pressed a button to initiate the trial. The first two 
sentences in each scenario were each presented as a whole; participants read them at their own 
pace, pressing a button to move on from the first to the second sentence to the next. After 
pressing a button following the second sentence, a fixation cross (‘+’) appeared in the middle of 
the screen for 800ms, followed by a blank screen for 200ms. Then, the last sentence of each 
scenario was presented word-by-word (each word presented for 400ms, followed by a black 
screen interstimulus interval of 200ms). The last word of the final sentence appeared with a 
period, and was followed by an 800ms black screen. After this, a question mark (‘?”) appeared, 
remaining on the screen until participants responded, at which point the next trial began. 
Participants were asked to decide whether or not the scenario, as whole, made sense, and 
were instructed to give their responses by pressing one of two buttons (“yes” or “no”, 
counterbalanced across participants). They were instructed to wait until the ‘‘?’’ cue before 
responding, to reduce contamination of the ERP waveform by response sensitive ERP 
components.   
 
2.2.3 EEG recording: A set of 29 tin electrodes were held in place on the scalp by an elastic cap 
(Electro-Cap International, Inc., Eaton, OH). Electrodes were also placed below the left eye and 
at the outer canthus of the right eye to monitor vertical and horizontal eye movements, and on the 
left and right mastoids. The electroencephalography (EEG) signal was referenced to the left 
mastoid online. The EEG signal was amplified by an Isolated Biometric Amplifier (SA 
Instrumentation Co., San Diego, CA) with a band pass of 0.01–40 Hz. It was continuously 
sampled at 200 Hz and the impedance was kept below 5k Ohm.  
 
2.2.4 ERP analysis: ERPs were averaged offline at each electrode site in each experimental 
condition. Trials contaminated by eye artifact or amplifier blockage were excluded from 
analyses. Of the participants who were included in the final analysis, artifact contamination from 
eye movement or amplifier blocking led to the rejection of 6.7% of trials (on average). A 2 x 2 
within-subjects ANOVA revealed no differences across the four experimental conditions in the 
rate of artifact rejection (no main effects of Verb factivity or Event confirmation or interactions 
between these two factors, Fs < 0.73, p > .4). For ERP analyses, we included all trials, regardless 
of participants’ end-of-sentence judgments, because these judgments may not have necessarily 
reflected neural activity evoked at the point of the critical words themselves, and because we 
aimed to retain counterbalancing of our critical stimuli.  
 Here, we report the results of mass univariate analyses in which tests are carried at 
multiple time points and electrode sites and a permutation-based cluster mass test is used to 
account for multiple comparisons (Groppe, Urbach & Kutas, 2011; Luck, 2014). While this 
method has sometimes been viewed as a way of exploring uncharacterized ERP effects across 
the whole brain, recent simulations in our lab show that when such tests are carried out across 
broad spatial regions that correspond to components of interest, this approach does not sacrifice 
power to detect ERP effects (Fields, 2017a; Fields & Kuperberg, In Preparation), and it does not 
inflate Type 1 error rate.6 To carry out this analysis, we used the Mass Univariate ERP Toolbox 
(Groppe, Urbach & Kutas, 2011) and the Factorial Mass Univariate ERP Toolbox (Fields, 
2017b) using a -100-0ms pre-stimulus baseline. To probe the late posterior positivity/P600, we 
carried out tests within a broad parietal-occipital spatial region of interest (CP1, CP2, P3, Pz, P4 
O1, Oz, O2), which captures the full set of electrode sites where numerous previous studies have 
reported this effect. We carried out tests at all sampling points within two time windows: 500-
700ms and 700-900ms to capture the earlier and later portions of the effect (following previous 
work that has emphasized that the late posterior positivity/P600 effect is not a monolithic 
component and that it is likely to reflect neurocognitive mechanisms with different latencies, see 
Friederici, Mecklinger, Spencer, Steinhauer, & Donchin, 2001; Gouvea, Phillips, Kazanina, & 
                                                 
6 In an earlier analysis of this dataset, we carried out an omnibus repeated-measures ANOVA, which we followed 
up with simple effects ANOVAs. In these ANOVAs, the dependent variable was the average ERP evoked across 
pre-specified temporal windows within several spatial ‘regions’ (groups of electrode sites) across the scalp. Region 
was included in the ANOVAs as a within-subject independent variable. However, as recently discussed by Luck and 
Gaspelin (2017), this approach creates multiple opportunities to detect effects in different spatial regions 
(potentially, a main effect, interactions with Region and additional effects at each region). It therefore increases the 
likelihood of Type I error. This is why we chose to report the results of a mass univariate analysis of our data here. 
Nonetheless, we report the results of our original analysis in Supplementary Materials for completeness. The pattern 
of findings was the same. 
Poeppel, 2010, and see Discussion, section 4.1). To examine the N400 component, we carried 
out a similar analysis on centroparietal sites (C3, Cz, C4, CP1, CP2, P3, Pz, P4) between 300-
500ms. 
 Within each of these broad spatial regions of interest, we carried out 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVAs, which crossed Event consistency and Verb factivity (both within-participant 
factors) at all sampling points at each electrode site in each participant. Consecutive data points 
at electrodes within 8cm of one another (assuming a head diameter of 56cm) that exceeded a pre-
set uncorrected p-value of 0.05 or less were considered clusters. The individual F-statistics 
within each cluster were summed to yield a cluster mass statistic. Next, we randomly re-assigned 
the values across the four conditions at each sampling point at all electrode sites within each 
participant, and calculated cluster-level statistics as described above. This was repeated 10,000 
times. For each randomization, we took the largest cluster mass statistic, and in this way created 
a null distribution for the cluster mass statistic. Then we compared our observed cluster-level test 
statistic against this null distribution. Any clusters falling within the top 5% of the distribution 
were considered significant. 
 Any significant interaction between Event consistency and Verb factivity were followed 
up with planned repeated measures ANOVAs that directly compared ERPs to event consistent 
and inconsistent critical words in the factive and non-factive scenarios separately, once again 
using a mass univariate approach with similar parameters (see Fields, 2017b for discussion for 
why an F- rather than a t-test is more appropriate for this follow-up).  
 
3 Results 
3.1 Behavioral findings: We classified the event consistent scenarios in both verb categories as 
making sense (requiring a “yes” response), and the event inconsistent scenarios in both verb 
categories as not making sense (requiring a “no” response). We treat these classification as 
‘correct’ responses in our analysis of accuracy. However, we note that these judgments are 
somewhat subjective, and because they were made at end of each sentence, they may not 
necessarily reflect neural activity at the point of the critical words. Overall, participants’ 
judgments matched our prior categorizations, with an average of 90% correct responses (Table 
3).  
 A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant difference in accuracy 
between the factive and non-factive scenarios (F(1, 95) = 20.6, p = .09). However, there was a 
significant main effect of Event consistency (F(1, 95) = 20.6, p < .001) due to greater accuracy in 
classifying the event consistent scenarios than the inconsistent scenarios. There was also a near-
significant interaction between Event consistency and Verb factivity (F(1, 95) = 20.6, p = .06), 
which was driven by a greater tendency to judge the event inconsistent factive scenarios than the 
event inconsistent non-factive scenarios as not making sense (t = 2.05, p = .05), but no 
significant difference between the factive and the non-factive event consistent scenarios (t = 
0.59, p = .56). These findings mirror the plausibility norms obtained at the point of the critical 
word itself. 
Table 3. The mean percentage of responses that were classified as ‘correct’ based on our prior 
categorizations. In the event consistent scenarios, we coded “yes” responses as correct responses. 
In the event inconsistent scenarios, we coded “no” responses as correct responses.  
Scenario Type Mean correct responses  
Factive consistent 93.0% 
Factive inconsistent 86.7% 
Non-factive consistent 93.5% 
Non-factive inconsistent 82.3% 
 3.2 ERPs 
Our primary question was whether the magnitude of the late posterior positivity/P600 effect on 
event inconsistent (versus event consistent) critical words would be larger in the factive than the 
non-factive scenarios.  
 
3.2.1 Earlier portion of the late posterior positivity/P600 (500-700ms) We found evidence to 
support this hypothesis. Within the parietal-occipital region, between 500-700ms, there was a 
cluster that showed a significant interaction between Verb factivity and Event consistency (p = 
.04, Table 4). The cluster analysis revealed no significant main effect of either factor (ps > .1). 
To explore the source of the interaction, we examined the effect of Event consistency in the 
factive and non-factive scenarios separately within the same spatiotemporal region. In the factive 
scenarios, a cluster showed a main effect of Event consistency (p = .01), reflecting a larger late 
posterior positivity/P600 on event inconsistent than event consistent critical words (Figure 1, 
Table 4). In the non-factive scenarios, however, there were no clusters showing a significant 
effect of Event consistency. 
 
3.2.2 Later portion of the late posterior positivity/P600 (700-900ms) Between 700-900ms, there 
was a cluster that showed a main effect of Event consistency (p = .02) due to a larger positivity 
on event inconsistent than event consistent critical words (Figure 1, Table 4). There were no 
clusters showing either a main effect of Verb factivity or an interaction between the two factors. 
Nonetheless, we carried out a post-hoc analysis examining the effect of Event consistency in the 
factive and non-factive scenarios separately in the same spatiotemporal region. In the factive 
scenarios, a cluster showed a marginally significant main effect of Event consistency (p = .06), 
reflecting a larger late posterior positivity/P600 within this time window on event inconsistent 
than event consistent critical words. In the non-factive scenarios, there were no clusters showing 
a significant effect of Event consistency. 
 
3.2.3 N400 (300-500ms) 
A secondary question was whether we would also see a larger effect of event consistency on the 
N400 in the factive than in the non-factive scenarios. We found no evidence for this: while a 
marginally significant cluster was identified for the interaction between the two variables (p = 
.08), follow-up ANOVAs comparing the effects of Event consistency in the factive and non-
factive scenarios separately failed to reveal any significant clusters (all ps > .1). Moreover, there 
were no significant clusters in the centroparietal region that showed either a main effect of Verb 
factivity or Event consistency (all ps > .1). 
 
Table 4. Characterization of significant clusters in the Mass Univariate Analysis.  
Time 
window 
Effect 
Cluster 
p-value 
Spatial extent 
Temporal 
extent 
Spatial 
cluster 
mass peak 
Temporal 
cluster mass 
peak 
500-700ms 
Verb factivity X 
Event 
consistency 
0.041 
CP1, CP2, P3, 
Pz, O1, Oz 
550-620ms P3 580ms 
Factive event 
consistent vs. 
factive event 
inconsistent 
0.015 
CP1, CP2, P3, 
Pz, P4, O1, Oz 
530-615ms Pz 600ms 
700-900ms 
Event 
consistency 
0.023 
CP1, CP2, P3, 
Pz, P4, O1 
825-890ms CP1 855ms 
Factive event 
consistent vs. 
factive event 
inconsistent 
0.062 
CP1, CP2, P3, 
Pz, O1 
770-880ms CP2 855ms 
Spatial extent: All electrode sites in which at least one time-point was included in the cluster. Temporal 
extent: All time points in which at least one electrode site was included in the cluster. Note that mass 
univariate approaches are not designed to determine the beginning or the end of an effect and so these 
time windows underestimate the true extent of the effects. Spatial cluster mass peak: The electrode site 
with the largest spatial cluster mass. At each electrode site, all F values across all time points appearing at 
that site were summed. The spatial cluster mass peak is the electrode site at which this summed F value is 
largest. Temporal cluster mass peak: The electrode site with the largest temporal cluster mass. At each 
time point, all F values across all electrode sites appearing at that time point were summed. The temporal 
cluster mass peak is the time point at which this summed F value is largest. 
 
 
 
4 Discussion 
In the linguistics literature, factive verbs are argued to trigger the presupposition that the events 
or states conveyed by their sentential complements are true (see Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1971, and 
much subsequent work). In the present study, we asked whether, under task conditions that 
Figure 1. Grand-averaged waveforms evoked by event consistent and event inconsistent critical words in 
factive and non-factive scenarios. Waveforms evoked by critical words that were consistent with the 
event or state conveyed by the preceding context are shown with black solid lines; waveforms evoked by 
critical words that were inconsistent with the event or state conveyed by the preceding context are shown 
with red dashed lines. Voltage maps show differences between ERPs evoked by event inconsistent and 
event consistent critical words in the factive and non-factive scenarios in the earlier portion of the late 
positivity time window (500-700ms). Note that although the voltage map for the non-factive scenarios 
suggests that a larger late anteriorly distributed positivity was evoked by event inconsistent than event 
consistent critical words, a post-hoc analysis showed that this effect was not significant (see 
Supplementary Materials).  
encouraged coherence monitoring, these presuppositions are incorporated into the 
comprehender’s discourse model, thereby influencing the pattern of neural activity evoked by 
later incoming information. To this end, we compared the effects of factive and non-factive verbs 
on processing incoming words that were either consistent or inconsistent with the events or states 
conveyed by the complements of these verbs (Table 1). Our behavioral data suggested that 
scenarios that were inconsistent with these prior events/states were rated as more implausible 
when they followed factive verbs than non-factive verbs. This was true both at the critical word 
(as reflected by our norming data) and at the end of each scenario (as reflected by the behavioral 
data collected during the ERP experiment). Our ERP data, which indexed neural activity that 
was time-locked to the onset of critical words, showed that between 500-700ms, the magnitude 
of the late posterior positivity/P600 effect evoked by critical words that were inconsistent (versus 
consistent) with prior events/states was larger in the factive than in the non-factive scenarios. We 
saw no differential modulation across conditions on the N400. Below, we discuss each of these 
findings in relation to the questions outlined in the Introduction and the previous literature, and 
outline open questions for future research. 
 
4.1 The late posterior positivity/P600 
 We suggest that the larger late posterior positivity/P600 effect between 500-700ms 
produced by critical words in the factive inconsistent (versus factive consistent) scenarios was 
evoked by the violation of the presupposition triggered by factive verbs and incorporated into the 
comprehender’s prior discourse model. For example, after reading the context, “Calvin needed to 
meet with his team members in the conference room. He was aware that it was busy.”, 
comprehenders incorporated the presupposition that the conference room was busy into their 
discourse model. They maintained this information over time and restricted their predictions to a 
particular event structure – a set of upcoming events/states that were compatible with this 
presupposition. New bottom-up evidence that the room was “vacant” thus violated this event 
structure prediction and conflicted with the prior discourse model. Comprehenders were 
therefore unable to initially incorporate the new input into the prior model (Xiang & Kuperberg, 
2015 and Kuperberg & Wlotko, 2018 for recent discussion). In contrast, no significant 
modulation of the late posterior positivity/P600 in this time window was observed following the 
non-factive verbs (e.g. “He presumed that it was busy”) because these did not trigger 
presuppositions and so comprehenders did not restrict their predictions to a particular event 
structure. 
 This interpretation of the late posterior positivity/P600 as reflecting the detection of 
conflict between alternative representations is broadly in keeping with previous characterizations 
of this component (e.g. Kuperberg, 2007, van de Meerendonk, Kolk, Chwilla & Vissers, 2009;  
Kim & Osterhout, 2005; Paczynski & Kuperberg, 2012; see Kuperberg, 2013, Xiang & 
Kuperberg, 2015 and Kuperberg & Wlotko, 2018 for recent discussion). In previous studies, 
comprehenders constrained their mental models and predicted upcoming event structures based 
on strong contextual cues, such as the animacy-based selection restrictions of verbs (e.g. 
Paczynski & Kuperberg, 2011, 2012; Kuperberg & Wlotko, 2018), strong semantic attraction 
between verbs and arguments (e.g. Kolk, Chwilla, van Herten & Oor, 2003; Kim & Osterhout, 
2005, Experiment 1), or particular discourse coherence markers (e.g. Xiang & Kuperberg, 2015, 
Experiment 1). Similarly, in the present study, factive verbs provided a strong cue for 
comprehenders to incorporate presuppositions about the truth of the information conveyed by 
their complements into their discourse model, and to restrict predictions of future events/states to 
those that were compatible with the presuppositions.  
Our findings are also consistent with those of another recent ERP study on 
presupposition: Jouravlev et al. (2016) reported a late widely distributed positivity effect that was 
evident between about 300-1000ms following the onset of the presupposition trigger “again” 
when it was inconsistent (versus consistent) with the event explicitly stated in the prior context 
(“Jake had never tipped a maid at the hotel before. Today he tipped a maid at the hotel *again 
…”). In that study, the positivity effect began earlier than in our study. This may be because 
Jouravlev et al. measured ERPs on the presupposition trigger itself and so the violation of the 
presupposition became evident more quickly — as soon as the presupposition was computed. In 
contrast, in the present study, we measured ERPs well after the presupposition trigger and so 
conflict between discourse model and the new incompatible event could only be detected once 
comprehenders had integrated the incoming word into its local context to infer the new event, 
which may have taken a little longer.7 Importantly, our findings extend Jouravlev et al.’s study 
by showing that truth presuppositions, generated at an earlier point in the discourse, were 
incorporated and maintained within the discourse model such that they influenced downstream 
processing with neural consequences when they were violated by new inputs. 
 Although the late posterior positivity/P600 is triggered by violations of predicted event 
structures, the precise neurocognitive processes that it reflects remain unclear. As noted above, at 
the very least, it is likely to reflect the detection of conflict between the comprehender’s prior 
discourse model and the input, resulting in an initial failure to incorporate this word into this 
                                                 
7 An alternative possibility is that, in the present study, the positivity did in fact begin earlier than 500ms, but was 
obscured on the scalp surface by an earlier opposite-polarity N400 component. This component overlap may have 
been less likely to occur in Jouravlev et al. (2016)’s study because the N400 evoked by function words (like 
“again”) is smaller than to content words and because the N400 would have been reduced by multiple repetitions of 
the same word (“again”). 
prior model and initially establish coherence (see Kuperberg & Wlotko, 2018 for recent 
discussion). It may additionally reflect prolonged attempts to re-establish coherence (cf. 
Kuperberg, 2007; Kuperberg, Caplan, Sitnikova, Eddy & Holcomb, 2006; Paczynski & 
Kuperberg, 2012). This may involve a reanalysis of preceding words in the context (e.g. the 
factive verb itself) to check whether they were accurately perceived (cf van de Meerendonk, et 
al., 2009) and/or a re-evaluation of the prior discourse model. Re-analysis and re-evaluation may 
sometimes lead comprehenders to successfully re-establish coherence by revising/repairing the 
prior model (see Kuperberg, 2013).8 For example, in the present study, encountering an event 
that is inconsistent with the predicted event structure may have led comprehenders to revise their 
prior discourse model by inferring that the protagonist’s knowledge was unreliable (e.g. that 
Calvin’s knowledge was based on false evidence) and abandoning the presupposition (that the 
conference room is actually busy). This, in turn, would have allowed them to incorporate the new 
input (“vacant”) into the revised model and re-establish coherence.9 
 Finally, we distinguish between processes engaged when presuppositions are violated 
(reflected by the late posterior positivity/P600) and processes engaged in accommodating 
                                                 
8 Reanalysis, re-evaluation and/or revision may engage domain-general mechanisms, including those indexed by the 
well-known P3b ERP component, which has been linked to more general ‘contextual updating’ processes (Donchin 
& Coles, 1988) and is functionally related to the  posterior late positivity/P600 (Coulson, King, & Kutas, 1998). 
These domain-general mechanisms may include a re-allocation of attentional resources (Sassenhagen, Schlesewsky 
& Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, 2014), the retrospective evaluation of the contents of working memory (Kuperberg, 
2013), the retrieval of information stored in episodic memory (Van Petten & Luka, 2012). 
9 This type of revision/repair may, in turn, be closely linked to adaptation over the course of the experiment, and it 
may have been reflected by the later part of the late positivity observed between 700-900ms, which had a more 
widespread scalp distribution (for a similar functional interpretation of this later portion of the late posterior 
positivity/P600, see Kuperberg, 2016, footnote 5, discussing results of a study reported by Chow, Smith, Lau & 
Phillips, 2015). It is also possible that participants adapted in this way to the non-factive scenarios. On this account, 
as the experiment progressed and comprehenders received increasing evidence that in 34% of scenarios the 
protagonists’ knowledge (factive scenarios) or beliefs (non-factive scenarios) would be disconfirmed, they became 
increasingly more likely to re-evaluate the reliability of the protagonists’ knowledge. Consistent with this idea, the 
main effect of Event consistency between 700-900ms was driven mainly by modulation in the second half of the 
experiment (as shown in a post-hoc analysis of this time window where no effect of Event consistency was found in 
the first half of the experiment, but a near-significant main effect of Event consistency was seen in the second half of 
the experiment). 
presuppositions. When a new input violates a prior presupposition, it cannot be incorporated into 
the comprehender’s discourse model unless she revises/repairs her prior model by abandoning 
the presupposition. In other cases, however, a new input may not immediately satisfy a 
presupposition, but it can still be incorporated into the discourse model without abandoning the 
presupposition. This is known as presupposition accommodation. Mechanisms of 
accommodation will vary, depending on the type of presupposition trigger and on the 
information provided by the context. They are therefore likely to be reflected by a variety of 
different ERP effects. Indeed, previous studies examining ERPs on definite noun-phrases, which 
trigger the so-called uniqueness presupposition — the inference that the NP refers back to a 
unique referent in the prior context (see Heim, 1982) — report modulation on several different 
ERP components (see Supplementary Materials for a discussion).   
 
4.2 The N400 
 In addition to asking whether factive verbs restrict predictions to event structures that are 
compatible with the truth of the states/events described by their complements, we also asked 
whether they enhance predictions of upcoming semantic features. We did not find clear evidence 
for this: there was no significant interaction between Event consistency and Verb factivity on the 
N400 component. Indeed, we saw no effect of Event consistency on the N400 at all (this was 
also true when we examined the factive and non-factive scenarios separately).  
  The absence of an N400 effect to event inconsistent versus consistent critical words is 
not uncommon, particularly when broad schema-based semantic relationships are matched across 
conditions (for discussions, see Kuperberg, 2016, and Supplementary Materials). For the purpose 
of the question asked here, this pattern of results suggests that while factive verbs restricted 
predictions to particular event structures (as reflected by the late posterior positivity/P600 effect 
when the event structure was violated), they did not additionally enhance the pre-activation of 
specific upcoming events and their semantic features (over and above those that were pre-
activated by more general schema-based knowledge). This is in line with previous reports that a 
posterior late positivity/P600 effect but no N400 effect can sometimes be produced by 
contextually inconsistent versus consistent critical words (see Kuperberg, 2007, for a 
comprehensive review). It also distinguishes factive verbs from other types of contextual cues 
that both constrain predictions to upcoming event structures and enhance the pre-activation of 
upcoming semantic features (resulting in both an N400 and a late posterior positivity/P600 effect 
when these predictions are violated, e.g., Xiang & Kuperberg, 2015, Experiment 1).  
 
4.3 Open Questions 
 Our findings raise important open questions. The first concerns the role of task. In the 
present study, participants were asked to actively monitor coherence by judging whether or not 
each scenario made sense. As we have previously discussed, task is one of several factors that 
can bias towards a late posterior positivity/P600, none of which is necessary or sufficient to 
produce the effect (Kuperberg, 2007, section 3.7). A late posterior positivity/P600 effect can be 
evoked in the absence of active coherence monitoring (e.g. Nakano, Saron & Swaab, 2010; 
Wang, Choi & Kuperberg, 2010; Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2005). Indeed, the widespread 
positivity effect described by Jouravlev et al. (2016) on presupposition violations was seen when 
participants carried out a more passive comprehension task. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence 
that a requirement to monitor coherence enhances the magnitude of the posterior positivity/P600 
effect (e.g., Xiang & Kuperberg, 2015). We have argued that this is because it both encourages 
deep processing of the context and the construction of a rich discourse model, as well as the 
detection of conflict when the bottom-up input violates constraints of this discourse model. 
 Our assumption is that this type of active coherence monitoring is a component of deep 
and successful reading (and oral) discourse comprehension (for early evidence, see Wagoner, 
1983; Garner, 1980; for more recent discussion, see Cain, 2016; Kim, 2014; van de Meerendonk, 
Kolk, Chwilla & Vissers, 2009). Without a goal of monitoring coherence, discourse processing 
can sometimes be dominated by passive memory-based processes (Myers & O’Brian,1998; van 
den Broek & Helder, 2017), resulting at times in shallow interpretations. This is particularly 
likely to occur in an artificial experimental environment after reading hundreds of short unrelated 
discourse scenarios, including many incoherent scenarios. Indeed, under passive reading 
conditions, comprehenders can sometimes fail to detect anomalies at all (see Sanford et al. 2011 
for evidence that the detection of incoherence can play an important role in triggering a late 
posterior positivity/P600 effect during passive reading comprehension). 
 On the other hand, with the type of binary coherence judgment task used in this study, we 
cannot tell whether the late posterior positivity/P600 only reflects the initial detection of conflict 
and the initial failure to incorporate the critical word into the prior discourse model, or whether it 
also reflects prolonged attempts to re-establish coherence through reanalysis/re-evaluation and 
revision/repair, as described above. One way of disentangling these possibilities in future work 
will be to explore how the posterior late positivity/P600 (and other ERP components) are 
modulated in tasks that not only require comprehenders to detect initial incoherence, but that also 
encourage them to actively repair and make sense of the scenarios. 
  A second open question concerns the relationship between presupposition and 
entailment. In the particular constructions used in the present study, the factive verbs did not 
only trigger the presupposition that the particular events/states conveyed by their sentential 
complements were true; they also entailed that these events/states were true (e.g., Chierchia & 
McConnell-Ginet, 2000 among many others). Entailments are strong inferences that cannot be 
canceled by subsequent information. For example, in the sentence, “He was aware that [the 
conference room] was unused.”, the factive verb “aware that” not only induces a presupposition 
that “the conference room is unused”; it also entails that the room is unused: any attempt to 
cancel the presupposition results in an ill-formed sentence (e.g. “*He was aware that [the 
conference room] was unused because it wasn’t in fact unused”). It is therefore possible that, in 
the present study, the ERP response evoked by the violation of these presuppositions also 
reflected the violation of this entailment.  
One way in which a future study might test this hypothesis is to include a set of negated 
factive stimuli, e.g. “He wasn’t aware that [the conference room] was unused”. Like its 
affirmative counterpart, this sentence also presupposes the truth of its complement (<the 
conference room is unused>). However, unlike its affirmative counterpart, it does not entail the 
truth of this complement: it is possible to cancel the presuppositions (e.g. the sentence, “He 
wasn’t aware that [the conference room] was unused because it wasn’t, in fact, unused” is not ill-
formed). Thus, if violations of these negated factive scenarios also produce a late posterior 
positivity/P600 effect (under the same task demands), this would provide evidence that the effect 
can be produced by violations of presupposition in the absence of entailment. 
 
4.4 Conclusion: 
 Our findings suggest that, during active discourse comprehension, factive verbs trigger 
presuppositions that are encoded and maintained within the comprehender’s discourse model. 
When downstream input violates these presuppositions, it conflicts with this prior model, 
producing a larger late posterior positivity/P600. More generally, our results add to a growing 
body of evidence that the brain is able to quickly draw upon the rich semantic properties encoded 
in single words or phrases to compute and encode information within a mental model, even when 
such information is tangential (“not at issue”) to the central message being conveyed by the 
discourse. 
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